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Although language legislation has been around in one form or another for
many years, the recent fervor to make English the official language of the
United States has taken hold like none before it. Proponents of English
language legislation' claim that the U.S. needs it to help immigrants better
assimilate, 2 to promote efficiency and fairness,3 and to preserve unity and
prevent linguistic division.4 Opponents respond with statistics indicating
that immigrants are assimilating just as they have for generations,5 that
English language legislation is inherently unfair because it alienates language
minorities,6 and that such legislation will not unify, but will exacerbate
linguistic and cultural divisions.7
* J.D. 1997. The author would like to thank Jeff Daniels for both his support and his
absence.
Proponents have used both "Official English" and "English Only" to describe their
cause. Today, Official English is the more popular term since English Only implies the
exclusion of other languages and proponents insist that their goal is to protect English, not
restrict the use of other languages. This note uses the term Official English or, more
generally, English language legislation, since those terms most accurately describe the
legislation currently under consideration in the Senate. See infra notes 22-30 for a discussion
of that legislation. Note, however, that opponents believe "English Only" more accurately
describes the movement because they believe that the practical effect of such legislation will
be to restrict other languages. Jose Roberto Juarez, Jr., The American Tradition of Language
Rights: The Forgotten Right to Government in a "Known Tongue", 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 443,
449.
2 H.R. 123, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(6) (1995).
' Id. § 2(a)(8).
4 Id. § 2(a)(4).
5 Frank M. Lowrey, IV, Comment, Through the Looking Glass: Linguistic Separatism
and National Unity, 41 EMORY L.J. 223, 301-02 (1992) (noting that studies indicate Hispanic
immigrants "anglicize" at a rate comparable to that of past immigrants).
6 Juan F. Perea, Demography and Distrust: An essay on American Languages, Cultural
Pluralism, and Official English, 77 MINN. L. REv. 269, 366-68 (1992).
7 See, e.g., Carl Rowan, U.S. Immigrant Bashers Cite "Lesson" of Quebec, CHICAGO
SUN-TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1995, at 43; see also Andre Sole, Official English: A Socratic Dialogue,
45 U. FLA. L. REv. 803, 825 (1993); see also Jim Fisher, Gingrich Misreads the Lesson of
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The debate rages on and both sides use whatever statistical or anecdotal
evidence they can find to support their arguments. Most recently, proponents
of the legislation have cited the rift between Canada and Quebec as evidence
of the divisiveness of bilingualism! If the U.S. does not declare English to
be its official language, they say, the U.S. could see Spanish-speaking
enclaves in Texas, California and Florida attempt secession just as the French
have done in Canada.9 But to analogize the United States and Canada in
this respect ignores significant historical and cultural differences between the
two nations and between the two language minorities.
Part two of this paper looks at the English language legislation currently
under consideration in Congress and gives an overview of the events leading
up to the 1995 Quebec secessionist vote. Part three examines two crucial
differences which invalidate the comparison between Canada and the United
States: first, both French and English have been guaranteed equal status in
Canada since its inception, while the United States has never officially
guaranteed the language rights of any immigrant class; and second, Quebec's
separatist movement involves a cohesive French culture, while English
language legislation in the United States targets Spanish-speaking immigrants
who lack the cultural cohesion to pose a serious secessionist threat.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. English Language Legislation
The framers of the United States' Constitution considered the question of
an official language, but ultimately chose to avoid the issue.'0 One
the Vote in Quebec, LEWISTON MORNNG TRmUNE, Nov. 1, 1995, at 12A.8 E.g., Gingrich Calls Quebec a Warning Signalfor U.S., REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, Oct.
30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File ("[The Quebec vote is] a serious
warning to all Americans that allowing bilingualism to continue to grow is very dangerous
and that we should insist on English as a common language and that it's what binds us
together."); Sean Somerville, Roth, Others Get Warm Welcome on English Proposal,
GANNETr NEws SERVICE, Dec. 6, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CURNWS File
(citing testimony of Rep. Toby Roth) ("[The near-secession of Quebec] should be the red
warning light that causes us to stop and think. Could America fragment like Canada almost
did?... The answer is a disconcerting but resounding yes."); 142 CONG. REC. H 9738, 9751
(daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cox) ("[O]nly the barest majority" managed to
save [Canada] from the kind of disintegration that we ourselves avoided in the Civil War").
9 Gingrich Calls Quebec a Warning Signal for U.S., supra note 8.
'0 Note, Official English: Federal Limits on the Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in
the States, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1345, 1348 (1987).
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commentator has noted that our "early political leaders recognized the close
connection between language and religious/cultural freedoms, and they
preferred to refrain from proposing legislation which might be construed as
a restriction of these freedoms."'"
Nevertheless, the first call for English language legislation in the United
States was heard in the early twentieth century in response to a wave of
immigrants from eastern and southern Europe. 12 The call was again heard
just after World War I, when war-inspired anti-foreign sentiments came to
a head. 3 In the early 1920s, Congress imposed restrictions on immigration
and the language issue all but disappeared from the political agenda. 4
The modem movement to pass English language legislation began in the
1960s when the lifting of immigration restrictions brought a new wave of
immigrants, this time predominantly Hispanic. 5 During the 1980s, the
Hispanic population increased faster than any other segment of the
population 6 and that trend is expected to continue well into the next
century." There is little doubt that the English language legislation
currently under consideration was prompted by this influx of Spanish-
speaking immigrants.18
When English Language amendments to the United States Constitution
" Heath, Language and Politics in the United States, in LINGUISTICS AND ANTHROPOLO-
GY 267, 270 (M. Saville-Troike ed., 1977).




15 Note, supra note 10, at 1349. Another factor contributing to the wave of immigrants
at this time was the passage of federal legislation protecting language minorities. E.g.,
Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3386 (1988); Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1973aa-la (1982).
16 Lowrey, supra note 5, at 267.
17 Id. The 1980 United States Census identified approximately 5.6 million Hispanics in
the United States. By 1990, that number had increased by fifty-three percent. Id. at 265-66.
"' Deborah Zabarenko, Drive Begins for English as Official U.S. Tongue, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, Nov. 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis CURNWS File ("While not
openly anti-immigrant, the measure would disproportionately affect Spanish-speaking
Americans.. ."); Gingrich Calls Quebec, supra note 8 (noting the concern of conservative,
pro-English language politicians about the growth of Spanish, particularly in states such as
California, Texas and Florida). See also Note, supra note 10, at 1346, 1348-49 (noting that
support for English-only has been strongest in states like California, Texas and Florida, which
have large Spanish-speaking populations); Perea, supra note 6, at 344-45 (noting that the
cause of the Official English movement is Hispanic and Asian immigration).
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failed to capture Congress' attention in the mid-1980s,19 proponents re-
directed their efforts to the states.' Today, twenty-three states have
adopted some form of English language legislation.2' In light of this
history, the recent popularity of federal English language legislation comes
as no surprise.
The English Language Empowerment Act,' passed by the House of
Representatives in August 1996, would make English the official language
of the United States' government and require the federal government to
conduct virtually all of its business in English.' Framed in terms of
"entitling" citizens to receive information in English, the bill would require
that government documents are printed in English only, thereby repealing a
portion of the Voting Rights Act which requires that bilingual ballots be
available for federal elections.25 The bill contains a number of exemptions,
including communications between members of Congress and their
constituents, foreign language instruction, national security matters, public
'9 E.g., H.RJ. Res. 171, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). See Dennis Baron, The English-
Only Question 189 (1990) (constitutional amendments to declare English the official language
of the United States, proposed in 1983, 1985 and 1987, met with little support).
20 Id. See Perea, supra note 6, at n.327 (language legislation has principally been the
province of state regulation, giving rise to question whether the federal government should
involve itself in this area at all). See generally Juarez, supra note 1, at 452 (discussing the
possibility of additional protection for language rights under state constitutions).
22 The following states have some type of English language legislation: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii (English and Hawaiian),
Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire,
North Carolina, North Dakota, South Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and
Wyoming.
" H.R. 123, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1995). Several other "Official English" measures
have been introduced recently. E.g.: S.426, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (same legislation);
H.R. 739, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (Declaration of Official Language Act of 1993);
H.RJ. 171, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) (proposing amendment to U.S. Constitution). This
paper focuses on the English Language Empowerment Act as representative of other similar
measures.
' H.R. 123. § 102 (proposed amendments to 4 U.S.C. §§ 161-69).
' 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (1994).
' The fate of bilingual voting programs under English-only legislation has sparked heated
debate. Those in favor of strict English-only legislation argue that such bilingual programs
prevent assimilation and foster a permanent language minority with no incentive to learn
English. Elimination of bilingual voting rights, opponents of English-only maintain, will
disenfranchise language minorities by preventing them from participating in the political
process. See Lowrey, supra note 5, at 276, 280.
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health and safety matters, criminal matters and Census documents.26 The
Act is intended to facilitate assimilation by immigrants, promote efficiency
and fairness and prevent division along linguistic lines.27 The bill, although
passed by a 259 to 169 vote in the House,28 still has a number of hurdles
to overcome. 29 Even if it passes the Senate in 1997, the Clinton Adminis-
tration has threatened a veto, denouncing the bill as "unnecessary, inefficient
and divisive.
' 3°
B. The Quebec Vote
On October 30, 1995, Quebec voters were called to the polls to determine
the fate of their province-would Quebec remain part of Canada or seek
independence? The final vote did little to settle the issue, since separation
was rejected by a mere one percent margin.3 ' The razor-thin margin
suggests the matter is far from settled, particularly in light of the composi-
tion of the secessionist vote: eighty-two percent of French-speaking
26 H.R. 123 § 102(a). Proponents of the bill point to these exemptions in an attempt to
distinguish this legislation from "English Only" legislation. They maintain that, since the bill
does not completely ban federal employees from oral communications in other languages, it
is more appropriately described as "Official English" legislation. See HOUSE COMM. ON
ECONOMIC AND EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITIES, H.R. Rep. No. 723, 104th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1996).
27 id.
2 Marc Lacey, House OKs English Only Legislation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1996, at Al.
2 In January 1997, opponents of the Act introduced a concurrent resolution entitled
'English Plus," which reaffirms the benefits of multilingualism and denounces English-only
measures as divisive and dangerous. As this paper goes to press, English Plus, with 23 co-
sponsors, has been referred to the Committee on Education and the Workforce. H.R. Con.
Res. 4, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
30 Lacey, supra note 28. The constitutionality of the bill was questioned after a 1995
Ninth Circuit decision struck down an English language amendment to the Arizona state
constitution as violative of free speech. Yniguez v. Arizona, 69 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 1995),
cert. granted sub. nom., Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 116 S. Ct. 1316 (1996).
The Supreme Court eventually decided the case on procedural grounds. Arizonans for
Official English v. Arizona, No. 95-974 (U.S. March 3, 1997). The decision leaves open the
question whether laws requiring public employees to speak only English in the workplace
would violate their First Amendment rights. See Joan Biskupic, High Court Test of 'English
Only' Will Have to Wait; Possible Test Case Not Valid Justices Decide, WASH. POST, Mar.
4, 1994, at A04.
31 Andrew Stark, Adieu, Liberal Nationalism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1995, at A27 (50.6%
to 49.4% in favor of staying with Canada).
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Quebeckers voted in favor of secession.' The separatist movement
undeniably centers around the language issue, but to suggest that Canada's
split is based solely on language ignores 200 years of conflict between
Quebec and its provincial neighbors.
Canada has maintained an official policy of bilingualism almost since its
inception. French and English were both recognized as official languages as
early as 186733 and legislation passed in the 1960s renewed that commit-
ment. However, despite official recognition on the federal level, the
rights of French and other minority languages have effectively been
disregarded in the Canadian provinces.35
Prior to the 1960s, language was not considered a political issue in
Quebec. Provincial political parties rarely addressed language differences in
their platforms and there were no proposals for government action with
regard to language.3 6 The mobilization of the nationalist movement in
Quebec in the 1960s can be attributed to a number of factors. One major
reason was a growing dissatisfaction with the commercial prominence of
English in Montreal.37 Although Quebec was overwhelmingly French-
speaking, portions of Montreal, with a substantial English-speaking minority
32 id.
33 The British North American Act of 1867 (BNA), now known as the Constitution Act
of 1867, declared that both English and French would be official languages. Section 133
grants the right to use either English or French before federal courts and in debates of the
Canadian Parliament. It also provides for the maintenance of legislation and legislative
records in both languages. R.S.C. 1985, app. II, no. 5, § 133 (1985) (Can.); see Terrence
Meyerhoff, Multiculturalism and Language Rights in Canada: Problems and Prospects for
Equality and Unity, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 913, 956 (1994). See infra notes 47-48
for a brief explanation of Canada's constitutional history.
34Official Languages Act, R.S.C. chs. 0-3, (1985) (Can.) (declaring English and French
to be the official languages of Canada).
35 Lowrey, supra note 5, at 228. The rights of language minorities have fluctuated greatly
since the enactment of the BNA. For example, in the 1800s, French had no official status in
Ontario or Acadia, despite the BNA's guarantees of equality. French was granted official
status in Manitoba in 1870, but that recognition was revoked in the 1890s. During World
War I, Ontario ended public-supported French language instruction and Manitoba, followed
by Anglophone western provinces, passed legislation prohibiting bilingual education. Id. at
227. Furthermore, the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism found, in 1963,
that French had become a second-class language in Canada, even in Quebec. Id. at 229.
36 Id. at 234.
' Id. at 234-35. Other factors widely considered to have contributed to the movement
are the migration of French-speaking artists, writers and intellectuals from rural Quebec to
Montreal, and the rise of a nationalist Francophone middle class. Id.
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controlling much of the Montreal economy, managed to function almost
exclusively in English." The Anglophone's commercial success effectively
relegated French to a second-class language within Montreal, so much so that
the English speaker in 1961 Montreal earned about 51 percent more than did
a Francophone and English was almost exclusively the language of corporate
Montreal.39
Nationalist sentiment in Quebec gained momentum throughout the 1960s,
with the language issue becoming increasingly prominent.' This growing
unrest prompted the Canadian government to pass the Official Languages
Act of 1969,41 which reaffirmed the equal status of French and English.42
Despite these efforts to assuage French-speaking Quebeckers, language and
culture continued to be a point of contention in provincial politics. 43 A
number of political parties emerged in Quebec at this time, with indepen-
dence as their central theme.44 The Parti Quebecois (PQ), formed in the
late 1960s, won the Quebec Provincial Parliamentary elections on its
separatist platform in 1976 and four years later Quebec held its first
"sovereignty-association" referendum, 45 which failed by a 3-2 margin.46
Although Quebec was not yet willing to separate from Canada, neither was
it eager to embrace a Canada that repeatedly subordinated its unique
Francophone culture.
The same fears of cultural and linguistic erosion which brought about the
1980 separatist referendum also prompted Quebec to repeatedly block the
id. at 233.
3 id.
40 See Anthony J. Davis, Note, Canada's Constitutional Crisis After Meech Lake, 18
SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & CoM. 223, 232 (1992) (called the Quiet Revolution, the movement's
goal was for Quebec to have greater control over its own affairs (the desire to become
"maitres chez-nous')).
4' R.S.C. chs 0-3, (1985) (Can.).
42 Meyerhoff, supra note 33, at 932.
4 Lowrey, supra note 5, at 232.
The Rassemblement pour l'Independence Nationale (RIN) was Montreal's first popular,
separatist political party. The Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ) was a radical separatist
group whose efforts included terrorism in Anglophone communities and kidnapping. Lowrey,
supra note 5, at 237.
'Id. The party platform called for total separation, but acknowledged the need for some
type of loose economic association with Canada.46 i d
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adoption of the Canadian Constitution.47 The Canada Act of 1982 finally
ratified the Canadian Constitution with the consent of all the provinces
except Quebec.4" The Act was legally binding on Quebec despite its
dissent, but many Canadians wanted Quebec to ratify the constitution
nonetheless.49
Quebec's offer to accept the Canada Act, subject to a number of
conditions, led to the Meech Lake Accord, a compromise designed to bring
Quebec back into the fold.50 While the Accord reaffirmed the bilingual
character of Canadian society, it also contained a clause recognizing Quebec
as a distinct society within Canada.51 Initially signed in 1987, the Accord
required provincial ratification within three years. 2 Events in Quebec
immediately prior to and during those three years raised fears among the
provinces about the rights of Quebec's language minorities and the Accord
47 Kevin Sneesby, Comment, National Separation: Canada in Context - A Legal
Perspective, 53 LA. L. REV. 1357, 1361 (1993). Prior to 1982, the Canadian Constitution was
not a single document, but was a body of law composed of written and common law rules
and constitutional conventions. Davis, supra note 40, at 235. The Canada Act of 1982
amended Canada's founding document (the British North America Act) to end all British
involvement in Canada. The Act also established the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms, granting individual rights for the first time, and renamed the BNA the Constitution
Act of 1867. What is now referred to as the Canadian Constitution consists of this amended
document and the pre-existing body of Canadian Constitutional law. Id. at 234-236.
' Davis, supra note 40, at 234. See also Sneesby, supra note 47, at 1361 ("French-
speaking Quebeckers refused to approve the Act, believing that adoption of the constitution
without specific protections for their distinct society, would accelerate the erosion of French
language and culture in an English dominated federation").
49 Sneesby, supra note 47, at 1363. According to fundamental constitutional law,
approval by a mere majority of provinces makes the constitution legal, but not legitimate.
Davis, supra note 40, at 238 (citing Richard S. Kay, The Creation of Constitutions in Canada
and the United States, 7 CAN. U.S. L.J. 111, 120-23 (1984)). Today, many separatists use
this argument to defend against claims that Quebec's unilateral secession might violate the
Canadian Constitution. See Colin Nickerson, Canada Challenges Legality of a Quebec
Secession; Supreme Court Gets a Formal Request for Ruling, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 27, 1996,
at A2.
o Sneesby, supra note 47, at 1364.
5 Lowrey, supra note 5, at 250. The clause stated: "The Constitution of Canada shall
be interpreted in a manner consistent with ... the recognition that Quebec constitutes within
Canada a distinct society ... The role of the legislature and Government of Quebec to
preserve and promote the distinct identity of Quebec ... is affirmed." Id.
52 Id.
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collapsed without ratification.53 The failure of English Canada to ratify the
Meech Lake Accord was viewed by many Quebeckers as symbolic
repudiation of Quebec's role in the Canadian federation.'
Canadian leaders again tried to convince Quebec to ratify the constitution
in 1992 with the Charlottetown Accord.55 The resulting document again
recognized Quebec as a distinct society, gave Quebec authority to preserve
and promote that society, and affirmed Canada's commitment to multi-
lingualism.56 Canadians rejected the agreement because it gave special
privileges to Quebec which, they believed, upset provincial equality.57
Quebec Francophones criticized the document for not granting them
sufficient powers to protect their unique culture5' and English language
minorities in Quebec feared that it would not protect their rights within the
majority French-speaking province.59 The ultimate failure of both the
Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords illustrates the inherent divisions
within Canada with respect to language and culture. Despite Canada's best
efforts, the Anglophone perception that French Quebec was being afforded
special status simply could not be reconciled with the Quebec view that its
French culture was not adequately protected.
53 Davis, supra note 40, at 243. From the outset, English Canada was wary of the
"distinct society" clause, fearing Quebec would use it to justify trampling the rights of English
minorities in Quebec under the guise of protecting French culture. Id. During the ratification
period, the Quebec government substantiated those fears by implementing legislation
prohibiting outdoor English signs, despite a Supreme Court decision declaring the law
unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See A.G. Quebec v.
Chaussure Brown's, Inc. [1987] 1 C.A.80. Even more disturbing to Anglophones was the
French reaction to the legislation. Sixty thousand French-speaking Quebeckers protested in
the streets, believing the bill did not go far enough. Lowrey, supra note 5, at 253.
' Lowrey, supra note 5, at 258. See also Barry Came, A Growing Sense of Alienation:
Quebeckers Review Their Options, MAcLEAN'S, Mar. 13, 1990, at 20-21 (opinion polls
conducted during the ratification period indicated that a majority of Quebeckers equated
rejection of the Meech Lake Accord with rejection of Quebec as a partner in the Canadian
federal system).
5 Meyerhoff, supra note 33, at 985 (provincial delegations met at Charlottetown to draw
up a Draft Constitutional Amendment addressing Quebec's concerns about its place in the
Canadian federation).
5 Id. at 986.
5' Id. at 990. See also Christopher K. Leman and Robert H. Nelson, The Rise of
Managerial Federalism: An Assessment of Benefits and Costs, 12 ENVTL. L. 981, 1006
(noting the importance of equality among states in constructing a strong central government).
58 Meyerhoff, supra note 33, at 992.
59 Id. at 993, 994.
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Quebec's dissatisfaction manifested itself two years later when the Parti
Quebecois won a majority in the 1994 provincial election by promising to
hold an independence referendum within one year.' The following June,
separatist leaders agreed to hold a "soft" referendum, requesting the authority
to re-negotiate the Quebec-Canada link, with full separation only if a
satisfactory agreement was not reached within a year.6' Fears about the
economic feasibility of Quebec's separation loomed large during the
campaign, and up until a few weeks before the vote, the separatist movement
seemed doomed.62 The tides turned, some believe, when separatist leaders
put away the economic forecasts and pulled out the language issue.63
Immediately following their defeat, separatists announced plans to continue
their efforts.' However, the enthusiasm for secession has waned somewhat
in the face of economic hardships. The uncertainty of Quebec's future has
taken its toll on the provincial economy, with rising unemployment rates and
a mass exodus by English businesses.65 Quebec's leaders, recognizing the
need to stabilize the economy, have pledged to hold off on another
referendum until after the next provincial election, expected sometime after
1998.6 Although the decision is delayed, the closeness of the 1995 vote67
and the level of emotion involved suggests that the issue is far from settled.
6 Joe Lauria, French and English in Quebec: An Uneasy History, DEUTSCHE PRESSE-
AGENTUR, Oct. 31, 1995.
61 Quebec's Place in Canada, IRISH TiMES, Nov. 1, 1995, at 13.
6 That's That, Until Quebec Tries Again, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 1995, at 45.
3 Id.
After the Vote/Apres le Scrutin, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 1995, at A16.
Don MacDonald, In Uncertain Quebec, a House Still Divided; One Year After Vote to
Stay with Canada, Bitter Debate Rages, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Oct. 31, 1996
(Montreal reports a 12.6% unemployment rate, the highest of any major metropolitan area in
North America).
"Id. Canada's Attorney General has asked the Supreme Court to answer three questions:
1) whether a unilateral declaration of independence by the Quebec legislature would violate
the Canadian constitution; 2) whether international law gives Quebec the right to secede; and
3) in the event of a conflict between the two, would Canada's constitution or international law
control? Quebec's leaders have vowed to ignore the Supreme Court's ruling, stating that
"Quebec's future will be decided by the will of its people, not Canada"). Nickerson, supra
note 49.
6 See Stark, supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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III. DISSECTING THE U.S.-CANADA ANALOGY
A. The Historical Distinctions
To view the Quebec independence vote as a warning to Americans of the
dangers of bilingualism is to ignore important historical differences in the
birth and growth of the two nations. The fragmentation currently plaguing
Canada represents the fruition of a separation that has existed since Canada's
formation.68
Quebec was a French colony before being forced into the British Empire
in 1763.69 When Quebec, Ontario, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia
combined to form Canada, the rights of both English and French speaking
persons were explicitly recognized in the nation's founding document.7"
While Canadian Francophones entered the confederation as a founding race,
language minorities in the United States enter primarily as immigrants.71
Spanish-speaking immigrants generally come to the United States expecting
to assimilate, at least so far as language is concerned,72 while the special
recognition of French-speaking Canadians effectively guaranteed they would
not be required to assimilate.73
The United States does not share the official bilingual history that French
Canadians see as a broken promise. Immigrants are not promised bilingual-
ism when they enter the United States, nor do they expect it.74 Unlike
6 Lowrey, supra note 5, at 264.
69 Fisher, supra note 7.
70 The British North American Act of 1867 (BNA); see supra note 33.
71 Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right to Vote, 44 EMORY L.J. 869, 891 (citing
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION,
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICs, FLORIDA 28 (1993) (in 1990, 79% of Cuban-
Americans in Dade County, Florida were foreign bom). See NATIONAL COUNCIL OF LA
RAZA, THE STATE OF HISPANIC AMERICA 1991: AN OvERvIEw 3 (1992) (most Mexican-
Americans today are those who (or whose families) have immigrated since the early 1900s,
not descendants of the first annexed Mexican-Americans).
n In fact, current immigration and naturalization laws require immigrants to demonstrate
literacy in English to become naturalized citizens. See 8 U.S.C. § 1423 (1988).
7 Davis, supra note 40, at 250.
74 While some critics argue that federal bilingual education has resulted in an unofficial
bilingual language policy in the United States, the program is, in fact, designed to aid
immigrants in their assimilation. The Bilingual Education Act provides funding for
transitional bilingual education, designed to teach Spanish-speaking students English, while
providing them with instruction in their native language to allow them to progress in other
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Canada, the United States has always been unified by a general consensus
that English was, and would be the common language.75 Furthermore,
Hispanics and other immigrants recognize the economic imperative of
learning English, as evidenced by the increasing demand for "English as a
second language" classes.76
Another distinction arises from the loose nature of Canada's federation,
which has fostered more provincial than national allegiance.77 Canadians,
particularly Quebeckers, tend to identify with their provinces more strongly
than with Canada as a nation.78 In contrast, the fifty states have come
together as a more tightly knit nation than its northern neighbor and the
regional identity is not found in the United States as it is in Canada.79
Americans possess a national sense of community, tending to consider their
status as Americans more significant than their status as "Tennesseeans" or
"Californians.
'se
subjects. 20 U.S.C. §§ 3281-3386 (1988). Critics of these bilingual programs argue that they
prevent assimilation by making it possible for language minority students to progress through
school in their native languages without having to learn English. This argument fails in light
of the fact that courts have invalidated plans which fail to "provide a method for transferring
students out of the program when the necessary level of English proficiency is reached." See
Lowrey, supra note 5, at 276. See also Cintron v. Brentwood Union Free Sch. Dist., 455 F.
Supp. 57, 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
" Lowrey, supra note 5, at 264.
76 The Language Government Act of 1995: Hearings on S. 356 Before the Senate Comm.
on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (statement of Daphne Kwock, Exec.
Dir., Org. of Chinese Americans) (in Washington, D.C., 5,000 immigrants were turned away
from English classes in the 1994 school year and in Los Angeles, there are waiting lists as
long as 40,000 for English classes).
77 Lowrey, supra note 5, at 260 (recent de-centralization of some federal programs such
as old age security and medicare have forced Canadian provinces to create their own social
welfare programs, thereby removing an important incentive for national unity); see also Greg
Taylor, The Forces of Division, MAcLEAN'S, Nov. 20, 1989, at 30 (trade barriers that still
exist between provinces foster provincial alliances). See Leman, supra note 57, at 997 (noting
that the U.S. Constitution sought to prevent divisive trade barriers by reserving control over
interstate commerce to the federal government).
78 Lowrey, supra note 5, at 260 (citing Carl Mollins, An Uncertain Nation, MACLEAN'S,
Jan. 1, 1990 (one poll found that 55% of Quebeckers identify themselves first as citizens of
Quebec).
'9 Leman, supra note 57, at 986 (the United States, although initially a loose collection
of states, has become increasingly reliant on a centralized, federal government as a result of
national crises such as the Civil War and the Depression).
'* Id. at 994-95.
QUEBEC INDEPENDENCE VOTE
B. The Cultural Distinctions
The distinction between French-speakers as a cohesive minority and
Spanish-speakers as a group with various ethnic backgrounds proves to be
a critical flaw in the U.S.-Canada analogy. Members of the secessionist
faction in Quebec identify themselves in terms of a single linguistic and
cultural heritage."1 Hispanics, on the other hand, do not identify themselves
in terms of a shared language, but in terms of their national origin. 2 So,
while Hispanics share a common language, they do not share the cultural
cohesion that was so important in giving rise to the secessionist movement
in Quebec.83
The immigrant status of the Hispanic population provides another division
within the group---between those foreign-born and American-born. s
Official English advocates warn that the concentration of Spanish speakers
in Miami, Texas and southern California, combined with the push for
multiculturalism in the United States, could give rise to secessionist
movements in those areas.85 However, once the presumption that Spanish-
speaking immigrants are a homogenous group is dispelled, the claim that
bilingualism threatens national unity makes no sense and the language issue
begins to look like a proxy for anti-immigration sentiment."
The analogy in question ignores two hundred years of tension stemming
from Canada's official policy of bilingualism and its ineffective application.
From its inception, Canada embraced linguistic dualism, recognizing that the
French and the British, as its two founding peoples, should share equal rights
and status as to their culture and their language.87 The historical disparity
81 Lowrey, supra note 5, at 246.
' Paul Brest and Miranda Oshige, Symposium: Race and Remedy in a Multicultural
Society: Affirmative Action for Whom?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 855, 890.
3 See generally Brest, supra note 82, at 883-90; see also Perea, supra note 6, at 355
(explaining that language is a poor proxy for national unity).
84 Brest, supra note 82, at 889 (citing RODOLFO DE LA GARzA ET AL., LATINO VoIcEs:
MEXCAN, PUERTO RicAN & CUBAN PERSPECrIVES ON AMERICAN PoLmcs 66-67, 69).
Mexican Americans born in the U.S. claim to feel as close to Anglos as to recent Mexican
immigrants. Furthermore, a majority of Puerto Ricans, Cubans and Mexicans believe that too
many immigrants are coming into the U.S. Id.
5 Rowan, supra note 7.
8 See Perea, supra note 6, at 355.
Meyerhoff, supra note-33, at 918. See R.S.C. Chs 0-3, (1985) (Can.); Can. Const.
(Const. Act, 1982) (Schedule B, §§ 16-23).
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between the French and English, despite this guarantee of equality, has
understandably left Canadian Francophones angry and frustrated.88 The
subordination of French culture and language within Canada was a major
factor contributing to the recent secessionist movement.8 9
It is inaccurate and misleading to suggest to Americans that a similar
situation may result in the United States if English is not declared its official
language. There is not now, nor has there ever been a call by any language
minority in America for equal status with English.' ° There is no official
bilingual policy in the United States.
Furthermore, the relationship between Quebec and the rest of Canada has
broken down, not because bilingualism is inherently divisive, but because the
Canadian government has failed to ensure the equal status it promised. An
examination of Canadian history and of the culture from which the Quebec
secessionist movement arose clearly shows that official English advocates
have taken the wrong message from the Canadian experience.
IV. CONCLUSION
A number of Congressional leaders have cited the narrow Quebec
independence vote as evidence of the dangers of bilingualism and the
resulting need for English language legislation. But this analogy is
ineffective in a number of ways. First, there are significant historical
differences in the birth and growth of ihe two nations and English language
legislation advocates ignore 200 years of history when they blame the recent
secessionist vote solely on Canada's official bilingual policy.
Second, French-Canadians were not immigrants, but were a founding race,
guaranteed equal status from the beginning. Immigrants to the United States,
on the other hand, expect to assimilate into American culture and accept that
knowledge of English is an economic necessity. Furthermore, Hispanics in
the United States lack the cohesiveness to pose a serious secessionist threat,
whereas the French of Quebec share a cultural, political and linguistic history
which ultimately gave rise to their secessionist vote. Those who cite the
8 See supra note 35 and accompanying text for a discussion of French rights in Canada.
89 See Sole, supra note 7, at 826 (quoting Maxwell Yalden, commissioner of Canada's
official languages, who stated: "We do not have a separatist problem in Canada because we
have two languages. We have the problem because we refuse to give status to the other
French language").
9o Lowrey, supra note 5, at 301.
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Canadian rift as a warning of the dangers of bilingualism seek to play upon
the fears of Americans, and they do so without regard to the facts which
clearly distinguish the two situations.

